Building on an institutionalist framework of the various organizational field-level pressures on firms to engage with the challenge of corruption, we analyse anti-corruption disclosures across a sample of 933 sustainability reports. Such reporting complements anti-corruption initiatives, as it allows the company to demonstrate its commitment. Our results show clear country-and sector-level differences in the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement. However, the more a company is exposed to corruption, the less likely it appears to openly communicate its anti-corruption engagement. Hence, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of anti-corruption disclosures as part of wider sustainability reporting.
Introduction
International trade and investment have accelerated tremendously during the last decades, but their growth has also been accompanied by an internationalization of corruption (Sanyal, 2005) . Corruption is, in simple terms, the abuse of authority for private benefit (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006) . Corruption matters because, at the firm level, it inflicts uncertainty and additional costs on business; at the societal level, it weakens societal institutions like courts and regulatory agencies, diverts funds away from food, health care, poverty alleviation or education projects, slows economic growth and misdirects entrepreneurial talent (Heywood & Rose, 2014; Rodriguez, et al., 2006; Svensson, 2005; Tanzi, 1995) . At the same time, the private sector has also been a major source of corruption in many countries, whether these are actions that benefit the company, such as bribing civil servants to obtain public contracts, or actions that benefit individuals within the company, such as nepotism in personnel recruitment (Argandoña, 2001; Sikka & Lehman, 2015) .
Hence the quality of corporate reporting practicesboth the disclosure of financial and additional information on the firm's social and environmental performance as well as the auditing of this informationhave an important role to play in constraining corruption (Kimbro, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993) . Countries that have more transparent reporting standards and a higher concentration of accountants were thus found to be less corrupt (Malagueño, Albrecht, Ainge, & Stephens, 2010; Wu, 2005) . The prior accounting literature on corruption predominantly falls into three categories: it is either largely conceptual (e.g. Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2007) , or it discusses individual cases of corruption (e.g. Sharma & Lawrence, 2015) , or it utilises relatively small samples of countries (e.g. 61 countries in Kimbro, 2002) . By contrast, this paper offers a cross-national study of firms from all five continents.
More specifically, the paper focuses on the extent to which companies openly communicate their engagement with corruption. Through publicly reporting its anti-corruption initiatives, a company can demonstrate its commitment to addressing this challenge, thus giving more credibility to its efforts as well as raising awareness of corruption-related problems.
Communicating on anti-corruption measures is therefore an important complement to a company's actual engagement in anti-corruption initiatives. Based on this logic, anticorruption measures have become a key part of sustainability reporting and have become a standard element of mainstream reporting guidelines, such as those by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). At the same time, corporate reporting on anti-corruption may not lend itself easily to voluntary, beyond compliance sustainability reporting. Given the nature of the problem, companies may choose to avoid the topic as part of their sustainability disclosures rather than proactively and transparently addressing the issue. Hence, we explore how companies address anti-corruption as part of their sustainability reporting, and compare and contrast anti-corruption reporting to the disclosure of other sustainability-related aspects.
The paper makes a number of contributions to the literature on corporate engagement in anticorruption measures. First, we do find patterns in terms of country-and sector-level differences in reporting on anti-corruption; more specifically, reporting appears to be negatively related to the degree to which companies are exposed to corrupt practices. In other words, the higher the likelihood that a company is exposed to corrupt practices, the less likely it is to communicate its anti-corruption engagement. Secondly, we also find that specific anticorruption initiatives, like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), are much more effective in encouraging companies to openly engage with the issue than generalist ones, such as the United Nations Global Compact. Both findings have significant repercussions for the future design of CSR initiatives.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section defines corruption and briefly outlines its enormous costs to firms and wider society before introducing key government, multistakeholder and corporate initiatives in this area. Thereafter, the prior literature on corruption and corporate reporting is reviewed briefly. This is followed by a section that outlines the theoretical basis of the paper in institutional theory and develops a set of hypotheses to guide the analysis in the remainder of the paper. Thereafter, the methodological details of the quantitative study that underlies the paper are presented. The results section then presents the findings from the various statistical analyses. In concluding, the most important implications of the paper's findings for academic research and management practice in the area of anti-corruption are discussed, its limitations are outlined as well as directions drawn out for future research into the role of businesses in society across different national settings.
The Nature of Corruption
Corruption occurs where decision-makers violate their duty to act in a neutral and impartial manner to pursue societal welfare and, instead, aim to generate benefits for themselves or for closely related persons. This duty requires that "personal or other relationships should play no role in economic decisions that involve more than one party" (Tanzi, 1995, p. 161) , in other words that decisions should be made at arm's length. Thus corruption can be defined in a generic fashion as "the intentional non-compliance with the arm's-length principle aimed at deriving some advantage for oneself or for related individuals from this behavior" (Tanzi, 1995, p. 167) . 1 The costs of corruption at both societal and firm level are well documented by now (Bardhan, 1997; Doh, et al., 2003; Galang, 2012; Hess & Dunfee, 2000; Heywood & Rose, 2014; Jain, 2001; Svensson, 2005) . To start with, corruption imposes significant additional costs on firms and private individuals (Galang, 2012; Luo, 2002) . According to estimates by the World Bank, world-wide bribery costs at least US$ 1 trillion a year (Rose-Ackermann, 2004) .
Corruption also imposes non-monetary costs in the forms of bureaucratic delay, greater information processing difficulty and heightened uncertainty (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Luo, 2011) . Economic actors face further costs when, because of corruption, they are unable to use societal institutions such as courts for the enforcement of contracts (Bardhan, 1997; Svensson, 2005) . At a societal level, corruption is likely to reduce public expenditure, because economic activity outside the official economy generates less tax revenues, if any at all; predatory behaviour by corrupt politicians thus diverts funding away from education, health care and infrastructure projects (Mauro, 1998; Svensson, 2005) . Corruption weakens key societal institutions, like courts and regulatory agencies, hence perpetuating the situation (Doh, et al., 2003) . Furthermore, corruption has adverse effects on economic growth as it tends to reduce investment due to the additional operational inefficiencies (Bardhan, 1997; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Mauro, 1995) . In addition to hampering economic growth, corruption can also influence the distribution of income within a society (Jain, 2001) . In particular, the poorest in a society are the least likely to have resources for bribing and are hence further disadvantaged (Bardhan, 1997) .
Anti-corruption measures have traditionally been in the domain of government legislation. Notwithstanding these regulatory efforts, anti-corruption legislation still suffers from implementation deficits at national and cross-national levels (Cragg & Woof, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008b) . Hence softer governance mechanisms have emerged to fill this gap, in particular at the international level. These include high-profile multi-stakeholder initiatives, for example the Publish What You Pay Initiative (PWYP), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the World Economic Forum's Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI), or the Wolfsberg Principles. Governmental and intergovernmental initiatives, like the OECD and UN ones, have thus increasingly been supplemented with initiatives by the private sector itself.
Corruption and Corporate Reporting
Corruption is an important topic for management and accounting scholars. As the purpose of accounting is to provide information on the financial, and increasingly also social and environmental performance of a company, its role also includes the provision of data that are essential to the control and prevention of corrupt activities. Greater transparency in company reporting thus leads to a higher probability of corrupt acts being detected, which reduces the information asymmetry between principals and agents and enables shareholders and other stakeholders to make more informed decisions (Wu, 2005) . Accounting can play a dual role here: on the one hand, financial reporting provides information about transactions, extended by sustainability reporting to their social and environmental impact; on the other hand, auditing serves as a monitoring mechanism to check on the accuracy of this information, hence discouraging financial misappropriation (Kimbro, 2002) .
Accounting scholars have examined corruption from three major perspectives. First, there are conceptual studies. For example, Everett, Neu and Rahaman (2007) draw on Foucauldian governmentality to distinguish between two framings of the global fight against corruption and the role of accounting in it. An orthodox framing, as is evident in publications by major anticorruption organisations like the World Bank, the OECD or Transparency International, presents the contribution of accounting to the struggle against corruption as a relatively straightforward endeavour. By contrast, a radical framing hones in on class-, race-and gender-based subjectivities of this struggle to suggest that accounting may also facilitate, rather than combat corruption (see also Sikka, 2010) . A second stream of the literature examines individual cases of corruption in detail. As an example, Sharma and Lawrence (2015) analysed the privatization of Telecom Fiji and argue that the privatization process, carried out with technical support of accounting consultants, led to a redistribution of wealth in favour of the political elite, rather than improved organizational performance or enhanced wellbeing of ordinary citizens. A third group of studies statistically examines the link between the level of corruption in a country and various socio-economic and cultural factors, but also including the quality of accounting. For instance, Kimbro (2002) finds that countries with well enforced laws, an effective judicial system, good financial reporting standards and a wide availability of accountants display lower levels of corruption.
Closely related to the role of accountants and accounting in the fight against corruption is the question of how companies communicate their engagement with this challenge. Public reporting of a company's commitment to anti-corruption measures can increase awareness of the issue among internal and external stakeholders, and in turn gives a company's anticorruption engagement more credibility, as it allows its stakeholder to scrutinize the company's efforts (Clark & Hebb, 2005) . Hence anti-corruption measures have become part and parcel of corporate reporting on social and environmental impacts. In this context, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has emerged as the key normative body. To date, several thousand companies have used the GRI Reporting Guidelines as guidance for their sustainability reports; in 2010, 82% of Fortune Global 250 companies adhered to the GRI Guidelines (KPMG, 2013) . The guidelines stipulate generic principles for the publishing of sustainability reports as well as a set of 79 performance indicators referring to six sustainability-related dimensions, namely economic performance (9 indicators), environmental impact (30), labour practices and decent work (14), human rights (9), society (8) and product responsibility (9). As part of the 'society' category, three indicators are specifically dedicated to a company's engagement in anti-corruption initiatives:
 SO2: Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related to corruption (henceforth "Corruption Analysis").
 SO3: Percentage of employees trained in organization's anti-corruption policies and procedures ("Corruption Training")  SO4: Actions taken in response to incidents of corruption ("Corruption Responses") .
All three are classified as core indicators; thus any company publishing a sustainability report along GRI guidelines is expected to address them. 
Theory and Hypothesis Development
The question of how firms report on their engagement with corruption can be addressed through institutional theory, which has repeatedly been drawn upon in the accounting literature (e.g. Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Dirsmith, Heian, & Covaleski, 1997; Lounsbury, 2008) . The theory is particularly appropriate for this question as it provides a theoretical explanation of how firms respond to non-market pressures, such as governmental, societal and cultural ones (Oliver, 1991; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005) . Although there is no single accepted approach (Scott, 2014) , institutionalism seeks to address the question of how the behaviour of societal actors is affected by institutions, i.e. by "formal and informal rules, regulations, norms, and understandings that constrain and enable behaviour" (Morgan, Campbell, Crouch, Pedersen, & Whitley, 2010, p. 3) . Institutional theory sees organizations, such as a firm, as being embedded in a multitude of relations with external actors (Dacin, Ventresca, & Beal, 1999) . Collectively these make up an organizational field, which DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p 148) define as "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life", i.e. that are linked together through frequent interactions, information flows, and mutual identification as members of the field (see also Scott, 2014) . In order to gain access to resources that are imperative for their survival, organisations must maintain legitimacy in the eyes of field constituents and hence subject themselves to isomorphic pressures.
However, organizations are not just passive recipients; rather they may have varying degrees of freedom to enact strategic responses to institutional pressures (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011; Oliver, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002) . As the organizational field "forms around a central issue" (Hoffman, 2001, p. 135) , there is room for vastly different conceptualizations of the field, e.g. around specific technologies or dominant organizations. The literature has thus recognized that firms, in particular MNEs, "face multiple, fragmented, nested, or often conflicting institutional environments" (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008, p. 998) . Building on the argument by Smith and Meiksins (1995) that any company is subject to three sources of external influence on its organizational practices, namely those arising (i) from the economic mode of its production, (ii) from national legacies in its country and (iii) from the global diffusion of 'best practice' or universal modernization strategies, we argue that the organizational environment for corporate engagement with anti-corruption initiatives can equally be conceptualized in three different ways, as country level pressures, as sectoral pressures level and as pressures for global standardization. In other words, the sector and the home country a company is embedded in are likely to exert field-level pressures that shape the extent, nature and content of its engagement with corruption. In addition, companies are subject to further field-level pressures exerted by global anti-corruption initiatives.
Country Level and Regional Level Pressures
A number of studies have shown how countries differ in terms of the amount of corruption they experience (Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan, & Bixby, 2010; Cullen, Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004; Husted, 1999; Jain, 2001; Mauro, 1995; Sanyal, 2005; Treisman, 2000) . These differences have been linked to differences in countries' economic development (Baughn, et al., 2010; Cullen, et al., 2004; Husted, 1999; Sanyal, 2005) , where corruption generally tends to be more widespread in countries with lower income levels (Svensson, 2005; note, however, the critique that there may be a Western bias in defining and measuring corruption, see e.g. de Maria, 2008) . In addition, the quality of political institutions has been found to influence corruption levels (Cullen, et al., 2004) . Crucially, in democratic societies, voters have the opportunity to vote corrupt politicians out of office (Jain, 2001) , while the presence of watchdogs like Transparency International ensures better information flows on corrupt practices (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002) . Another key influence on corruption are a society's cultural values and moral code (Baughn, et al., 2010; Cullen, et al., 2004; Sanyal, 2005; Treisman, 2000) . For example, three of Hofstede's variableshigh uncertainty avoidance, high masculinity, and high power distancewere found to explain high levels of corruption (Husted, 1999) . Likewise, cultures with a strong emphasis on hierarchy were found to exhibit higher levels of corruption whereas egalitarian cultures correlate with lower levels (Akbar & Vujić, 2014) . As Spencer and Gomez (2011, p. 281) argue, "characteristics of corruption can become so institutionalized that they become fundamental components of a country's institutional environment"; hence they exert isomorphic pressure on a firm to accept these.
Equally, country-of-origin effects have for some time now been identified in corporate sustainability reporting (for recent overviews see Fifka, 2013; Fortanier, Kolk, & Pinkse, 2011) . Whilst the vast majority of international comparative studies on sustainability reporting tended to focus on country-level and regional-level differences in or between North America and Europe (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Halme & Huse, 1997; Kolk, 2005) , more recent studies have also focused on developing and emerging economies (Baskin, 2006; Belal, Cooper, & Roberts, 2013; Chapple & Moon, 2005) . Clear differences have been identified in terms of the likelihood of reporting (Halme & Huse, 1997; Kolk, 2010) , report content (Baskin, 2006; Kolk, 2005) and the likelihood of assurance as well as the choice of assurance provider (Kolk & Perego, 2010) .
To an extent, these differences stem from differences in reporting legislation at the level of the nation state (Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Kolk, Walhain, & Van de Wateringen, 2001 ) and the regional level (see e.g. recent EU-level developments in this context). At the same time, the existence or salience of specific pressure groups (Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998; Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar, 2005) as well as underlying cultural and institutional contexts (Fortanier, et al., 2011; Kolk, 2005) have also been argued to result in country-level and regional-level differences in sustainability reporting. At a more general level, similar patterns have been identified between different world regions, both in terms of the nature of corporate social responsibility (Matten & Moon, 2008 ) more generally as well as the content of corporate sustainability disclosures (Kolk, 2005; Authors 1 & 2, 2012 Authors 1 & 2, , 2015 .
For the purposes of this research, we focus on regional-level differences in anti-corruption reporting. Building on international comparative studies in the context of corruption and of sustainability reporting, we hypothesize that similar regional-level patterns, i.e. patterns resulting from the extent to which companies are exposed to corruption, will emerge with regard to the question whether companies openly communicate about corruption. Hypothesis 1. There will be regional-level differences in terms of the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement.
Sectoral Level Pressures
Secondly, we expect sector-level dynamics to shape the extent to which a company reports on its anti-corruption engagement. Corruption differs between sectors as some industry structures provide a more suitable context for corruption than others (Luo, 2011; Moran, 1999) . In the words of Spector (2005, p. 6) : "One of the best ways to understand the spread of corruption and what can be done to control it, is by analysing its impact sector-by-sector."
For example, construction involves complex, non-standard activities where the quality of the completed project can be difficult to assess. Companies in the sector are furthermore closely linked to government, as a considerable portion of public investment goes to construction.
Under these conditions, it is no surprise that the "construction industry is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt industries worldwide" (Kenny, 2009, p. 21 ; see also Golden & Picci, 2006; 2009) . Similarly, the extractive industry is shaped by a number of conditions that make it riper for corruption than other industries. Firms have little choice over locations; they have to go where the respective resources are. Such geographic luck provides rent-seeking corrupt governments with the upper hand, as several multinationals, all with the necessary capital and know-how to exploit the resources, are jockeying with each other for concessions (O'Higgins, 2006) .
Similarly, a range of studies have identified sector-specific differences in corporate nonfinancial reporting (Fortanier, et al., 2011; Halme & Huse, 1997; Holder-Webb, Cohen, Nath, & Wood, 2009; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Neu, et al., 1998; Patten, 1991) . Sector-specific aspects include the extent to which a company from a specific sector is exposed to public scrutiny (Bowen, 2000; Patten, 1991) , the extent to which it modifies the environment (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Dierkes & Preston, 1977) , the frequency of critical incidents or accidents occurring in the industry and related public pressure (Neu, et al., 1998) , or an exposure to specific sustainability-related issues (Halme & Huse, 1997) . In parallel to these findings, we would expect to find a link between sector affiliation and the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement. For example, construction firms might address anti-corruption differently from other sectors given that the construction industry is widely perceived as being particularly prone to corrupt practices. Thus, we hypothesize that pressures to communicate openly about corruption will be linked to the extent to which different sectors are exposed to corrupt practices: Hypothesis 2. There will be industry-level differences in terms of the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement.
Global Pressures
A third source of isomorphic pressure on how companies engage with corruption are the recent fundamental changes in the global business context. "Issues that can affect the functioning of effective markets in one region of the world can now affect the entire global market; corruption is finally being recognized as one of those issues" (Hess & Dunfee, 2000, p. 600) . Interaction between civil society, national policy elites and international pressures has led in many countries to the emergence of a veritable anti-corruption industry (Sampson, 2010 ). Translated to the organizational level, Luo (2006) found that firms with a great emphasis on the implementation of CSR tools, such as codes of conduct and other corporate policies pertaining to major stakeholders, responded to increasing corruption by reducing their social connections with governmental officials, whereas firms with a lower emphasis on CSR tools actually increased the use of their social ties with government officials.
As discussed above, a range of initiatives have emerged that are dedicated to the fight against corruption. Whilst participation in anti-corruption initiatives might not necessarily be linked to a more sincere engagement with the topic but rather reflect a symbolic engagement (Heugens & Lander, 2009 ), a number of factors such as organizational learning (Ruggie, 2002) or increased exposure to stakeholders and thus greater pressure to act may indeed trigger a company's engagement with a given issue. Participation in anti-corruption initiatives may thus exert a positive influence on corruption-related reporting. For the purposes of this paper, these initiatives can be grouped into two categories.
On the one hand, there are broad initiatives in the context of CSR and corporate citizenship which promote corporate engagement with corruption as part of a wider array of aspects concerning the role of business in society. A key initiative here is the UN Global Compact.
Anti-corruption is specified as the 10 th Global Compact Principle alongside a range of other issues, such as human rights, labour rights, child labour and environmental sustainability (UNGC, 2015) . In general terms, the UN Global Compact has been found to have a positive impact on the comprehensiveness of CSR reporting (Chen & Bouvain, 2009; Fortanier, et al., 2011 at the core of all of these initiatives, we would expect that corporate engagement with these initiatives has a positive impact on corruption-related reporting practices (COST, 2015; EITI, 2015; PACI, 2015) . More formally:
Hypothesis 3. Participation in multi-stakeholder initiatives dedicated to anticorruption will make it more likely that a company publically communicates it anti-corruption commitment.
Research Methods

Sample Selection
We will test our hypotheses through an analysis of 933 GRI G3 2 corporate sustainability reports from seven sectors (banking; construction; electricity; industrial metals; mining; oil & gas and finally gas, water & multi-utilities) which were published in the years 2006-2009. These reports were identified through the Corporate Register database, a repository of corporate sustainability reports (www.corporateregister.com). As country of origin and sector affiliation are two central dimensions in this study, we only considered those countries and sectors for which a minimum number of reports were available (10 per country; 25 reports per sector). This enabled us to ensure a sufficient size of country and sector subsamples. For the identification of sectors, we followed the classification used on the Corporate Register website. All seven sectors included in the sample are to varying degrees exposed to corrupt business practices. According to the Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey (2008, 2011) , oil & gas, mining and in particular construction represent high-risk sectors in terms of Bribe Payers Index (BPI) scores; industrial metals, gas, water and multi-utilities as well as electricity occupy middle ground positions; and banking represents a low-risk sector in this context (nevertheless, corruption undoubtedly exists in banking & finance tooas can be illustrated by a number of recent high-profile scandals).
As the GRI G3 Guidelines were launched in 2006 and were replaced by their successor G4 in 2010, the final sample consists of documents reporting on the years 2006-2009. The initial sample consisted of 1,118 sustainability reports, which subsequently underwent screening. As the analysis focused on reporting on the three corruption-related GRI G3 indicators, those reports that did not follow the GRI reporting formatand therefore could not be codedwere excluded from the sample. In total, the final sample consists of 933 GRI G3 reports from 30 countries ( Table 2 ). In terms of sectors, banking represents the largest sector within the sample (n=209), followed by electricity (188) 
Variables
Coverage of GRI indicators SO2, SO3 and SO4 was used as the dependent variable. Hence, three sets of logistic regressions were performed. Table 3 presents the variables used in the analysis. Sector affiliation and region of origin were used as independent variables to indicate sectoral and regional-level differences in anti-corruption reporting. Likewise, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores were included as an independent variable in order to capture country-level variations in the exposure to corruption. Furthermore, (a) UN Global Compact participation as well as (b) participation in EITI, COST, PACI and the Wolfsberg Principles was included to identify the impact of relevant multi-stakeholder initiatives on reporting on corruption.
In addition, a number of further independent variables were included in the analysis. Levels of socio-economic development have previously been found to impact the likelihood of reporting as well as the content of these disclosures (Fifka, 2013) . For the purposes of this research, Human Development Index (HDI) scores (UNDP, 2015) were used to indicate levels of socio-economic development in the 30 countries included in the analysis. In addition, company size (Holder-Webb, et al., 2009; Patten, 1991) and internationalization (Chapple & Moon, 2005; Vormedal & Ruud, 2009 ) have long been identified as drivers of corporate sustainability disclosures. Both of these aspects were operationalized using employee data. Given the diversity of companies included in the sample (both in terms of geographic location and ownership), financial performance information was not readily available through standard databases such as Thomson. In contrast, employee data could be collected from corporate sustainability disclosures for all 933 reports as this is a standard GRI indicator. The ratio of companies' foreign employees divided by the total number of employees was used to indicate the degree of internationalization, modelled on the ratio of foreign sales to total sales (FSTS) as a standard measure in this context (Sullivan, 1994) .
Another two variables were used to capture a company's reporting regime: (a) the number of GRI G3 reports published by the company up to and including the report at hand and (b) the overall number of other (non-corruption-related) indicators addressed by each company in a specific report. Whilst the number of GRI reports a company has already published may indicate corporate learning over time and thus result in an 'upwards harmonization' of reporting (Fortanier, et al., 2011) ; the overall number of other GRI indicators may indicate the extent to which a company has engaged with the GRI guidelines, which in turn may influence the likelihood of the company to report on the three anti-corruption-related indicators as well (Author 1 et al., 2015) . Finally, the models used to produce the results were tested for robustness and compared to more complex models taking into account companylevel random effects and publication year of the report.
_______________________________
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE _______________________________
Data Analysis
The GRI content index of each of the 933 reports was transcribed into an SPSS database for subsequent analysis. Each indicator that was stated to be "fully" or "partially" addressed in the report was assigned the value 1; all indicators not addressed in the report were marked as 0. Only the generic set of 76 GRI G3 indicators was considered (46 of which are specified as 'core' and 30 as 'additional' indicators; the three corruption-related 'core' indicators SO2, SO3, SO4 were not considered here as they form the dependent variables in the logistic regressions); supplementary indicators as developed by the GRI for particular industries were not included. In an initial step of the analysis, a descriptive statistical analysis was performed, which focused on mean coverage levels across the total sample and on coverage levels for each indicator category. Subsequently, a series of binary logistic regression analyses was performed to identify how the different independent variables have influenced a company's likelihood of addressing the corruption-related GRI G3 indicators SO2-SO4. INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE   _______________________________   Table 5 shows a correlation matrix for the variables that have been used in the logistic regression analyses. It should be noted that very high levels of correlation exist between Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores and Human Development Index (HDI) scores for the company's country of origin. Relatively high levels of correlation can also be identified in the case of internationalization and number of employees as well as between internationalization and membership of initiatives dedicated to anti-corruption. Table 6 contains the data on Indicator SO2 (Corruption Analysis). For six of the independent variables, significant relationships can be identified. First of all, mining companies show significantly lower coverage compared to the reference group electricity, whereas the banking sector shows significantly higher coverage. In terms of regional-level variation across the sample, only Eastern European companies show a significant deviance from the reference group of Mediterranean European companies with clearly lower coverage.
Results
Overall Patterns
Results of Logistic Regression Analyses
A general pattern that emerges is that the more indicators a company reports onmeasured in terms of coverage of all 76 non-corruption-related GRI indicatorsthe more likely it is to report on indicator SO2 too. Likewise, the higher the number of GRI G3 sustainability reports a company has published prior to the report at hand, the more likely it is to address indicator SO2. Furthermore, companies that have signed up to the corruption-specific initiatives EITI, COST, PACI and the Wolfsberg Principles are more likely to report on indicator SO2; by contrast, such a significant impact cannot be identified for UN Global Compact participation.
Likewise, CPI scores do not appear to explain coverage levels for this indicator; neither do HDI scores, company size or internationalization.
_______________________________ INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
_______________________________
As can be seen in Table 7 Table 8 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis for indicator SO4 (Corruption Responses). Again, the patterns identified above are to a certain extent replicated for this indicator. Banking emerges as the only sector with significantly higher levels of coverage. In terms of regional-level differences, Australasian and North American companies show significantly lower coverage than the reference group of Mediterranean European companies.
In addition, significantly positive relationships can be identified for the number of previous GRI G3 sustainability reports, the number of indicators addressed by a company as well as for participation in narrow anti-corruption initiatives. By contrast, participation in the UN Global Compact does not appear to explain why companies report on their actions taken in response to incidents of corruption. Company size as measured by the number of employees shows a very small but significant negative impact.
______________________________ INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
_______________________________
In summary, a largely consistent pattern has emerged from the results of the three regression analyses presented above. We were able to identify clear regional-level differences in anticorruption reporting. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported. However, CPI scores were found to have no significant impact on corruption reporting, while HDI scores appear to explain coverage levels of corruption-related indicators only in the case of SO3 (corruption training). Therefore, the clear regional differences identified in the descriptive analysis presented above in Table 4 do not seem to be systematically linked to either the levels of socio-economic development or the perceived levels of corruption in these countries. Likewise, clear sectorlevel differences in anti-corruption reporting have been identified with regard to all three indicators. Thus, hypothesis 2 is also supported. At the same time, an interesting pattern has emerged from the analysis in that banking, as a sector that has consistently received high Bribe Payers Index (BPI) scores (Transparency International, 2008, 2011)indicating low levels of corruptionis also the sector in which anti-corruption reporting appears to be most widespread. In contrast, mining as one of the sectors with persistently low BPI scores emerged as the sector in which anti-corruption reporting appeared least widespread. With regard to multi-stakeholder initiatives on corruption, company participation in the UN Global Compact is not linked to more extensive reporting on anti-corruption engagement; however, participation in the narrow initiatives EITI, COST, PACI or the Wolfsberg Principles does have a positive impact on the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruptionrelated activities. Bearing this limitation in mind, the results support hypothesis 3 too.
Robustness of the Statistical Analysis
The models used to produce the results presented above were tested for robustness and compared to more complex models that take into account random effects relating to the company and the year of report publication as well as models that account for interaction between narrow and broad anti-corruption initiatives. The random effects of the company show that there is greater variability between companies than within any single company, as expected. Including the year as a random effect in the logistic regression showed very little variation between the years included in the study suggesting that the results are robust over the study period. As some company specific information was missing, the availability of such information could itself be related to the company and therefore create some bias in the results towards those companies that submit more information. This was tested using a factor to divide the data into groups according to how much company specific information was available and including it in a random effects model. However, the results showed little variation between the companies dependent on the amount of company-specific information available. Including random effects in the model did not change the fixed effects reported through this study. Finally, an interaction term was added between companies which had joined the UNGC initiative and any of the four corruption-specific initiatives (EITI, COST, PACI and the Wolfsberg Principles) to test the validity of the results with regard to hypothesis 3. This interaction term did not significantly improve the model fit and so is deemed unnecessary. We, therefore, argue that the logistic regression models used are suitable for this study and that the results of the statistical analysis are robust.
Discussion
The data presented here show that the conceptualization of organizational fields we developed in the wake of Smith and Meiksins (1995) has good explanatory power. All three types of field level pressures we expected to influence corruption-related coverage could indeed be identified. Furthermore, the analysis of corporate reporting on anti-corruption engagement concurs with previous studies that corruption is not a popular topic for business to discuss (Rodriguez et al., 2006; Svensson, 2005) . Although close to the average coverage for all 79 indicators of 57%, corruption was only addressed by 60% of all reports for SO2 (Corruption Analysis), 62% for SO3 (Corruption Training) and 58% for SO4 (Corruption Response). By comparison, the core indicator SO1 (Local Community Engagement) was addressed by 82% of all reports. As all three corruption indicators are core indicators and thus should be addressed by any company producing a GRI G3 report, coverage levels can be considered to be relatively low.
One would expect the relationship between analysis, training and response to be reasonably uniform across the sample, as the processes of identifying and responding to corruption are likely to be similar for all companies. Indeed, average coverage across the three corruptionrelated indicators was relatively uniform. Nevertheless, some notable sector-and regionallevel deviations from this overall pattern emerged from the analysis. The construction sector, for example, showed the most pronounced gap between SO2 (Corruption Analysis) at 58% and SO3 (Corruption Training) at 52% but SO4 (Corruption Response) at only 46%.
Similarly non-uniform relationships were found in the regional comparison. Here coverage levels in Eastern Europe of SO2 (Corruption Analysis) at 16%, SO3 (Corruption Training) at 16% and SO4 (Corruption Response) at 29% stand in stark contrast to coverage levels in East Asia of SO2 (Corruption Analysis) at 70%, SO3 (Corruption Training) at 84% and SO4 (Corruption Response) at 70%. At the regional level, very clear differences emerged from the descriptive analysis. Coverage levels of all indicators were low for North American companies (39-63%) and
Australian/New Zealand companies (48-52%), but especially so for Eastern European ones (16-29%). By contrast, the highest scores were achieved by companies in East Asia (70-84%) and South Asia (69-85%). Contrary to the literature (Baughn, et al., 2010; Cullen, et al., 2004; Husted, 1999; Sanyal, 2005) , the data did not show a clear systematic link between corruption coverage and the level of development or the level of corruption in the country, as Compact). It should be noted that our sample mainly included very large multinational companies, which might be exposed to more complex dynamics in their home and host context (cf. Brammer, Pavelin, & Porter, 2009; Spencer & Gomez, 2011) than can be captured through home country HDI and CPI scores.
The clearest link that could be identified with regard to regional-level differences in reporting on anti-corruption was that coverage of these indicators was significantly related to the number of other GRI (non-corruption-related) indicators a company addresses. This relationship was as expected: the more a company reports generally, the more likely it is to report on anti-corruption aspects too. This finding may be the result of either of two explanations (see also Author 1 et al., 2015) . On the one hand, it may indicate a ratchet effect in corporate social responsibility (CSR) tools: CSR measures get adopted through proactive firms responding to stakeholder expectations, others follow and over time the frontrunners' measures become diffused within their industry through mimetic pressureuntil higher stakeholder expectations set the cycle in motion again (Bertels & Peloza, 2008) . Indeed, coverage of SO2 (corruption analysis) and SO4 (corruption training) increases with the number of sustainability reports a company has published, therefore reflecting some sort of upwards harmonization of reporting over time (Fortanier, et al., 2011) . On the other hand, many firms in East and South Asia are relative newcomers to corporate sustainability reporting, whereas the pioneers are more likely to be found in Europe and North America (Chapple & Moon, 2005; Kolk, 2005) . It would be conceivable that the pioneers, once they found their style, would be reluctant to change their reporting mode irrespective of whether it originally included anti-corruption aspects or not.
Differences in coverage are comparatively less pronounced at the level of the seven different sectors that were included in the sample. Nevertheless, some stable patterns can be observed, with banking consistently showing higher coverage levels than the other sectors, and mining showing significantly lower coverage for two out of the three indicators (SO2 and SO3). It is interesting to note that this pattern runs counter to the degree to which these sectors are commonly thought to be exposed to corrupt activities. In Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index (BPI) 2011, banking received a clearly higher score (indicating a lower level of corruption) than the other six sectors included in the sample; in contrast, mining ranges among those sectors with a relatively low BPI score and thus represents one of the sectors in which corruption is perceived to be endemic. As such, our findings suggest that the degree to which a company is exposed to corrupt practices does not seem to predict whether it publicly communicates its anti-corruption engagement.
This finding tallies with the emerging literature on silences in corporate reporting (Buhr, 1998 (Buhr, , 2001 Stittle, 2002) . For example, Chwastiak and Young (2003, p. 533) suggest that "the ways in which costs are socially constructed under capitalism reduce labor and things to their instrumental identity as means to profit". They go on to show how consumer goods companies describe population growth in their annual accounts as opportunity for increased sales rather than in terms of ecological challenges of increased water consumption, overcrowding, destruction of wildlife habitats or loss of agricultural land. Similarly, annual reports of defence contractors discussed the end of the Cold War not as historic step towards international peace but as in terms of loss of contracts, sales, and markets. Relatedly, Stittle (2002, p. 367) found that corporate attempts to extend the nature and depth of the content of their annual reports and accounts have "predominantly resulted in an advertising-oriented model, more concerned with favorable self-projection than an objective and open ethical assessment of their corporate activities."
Another important finding concerns the nature of CSR tools. Here our data showed a clear difference between the UN Global Compact and the other anti-corruption initiatives, namely EITI, PACI, COST and the Wolfsberg Principles. While the latter were significantly related to corporate reporting for all three indicators, not a single significant relationship could be found for the former. This finding indicates that the more specific a CSR initiative is, the greater its success is likely to be. The finding tallies with the argument by Kolk and van Tulder (2006) in the context of corporate responses to poverty alleviation that sector-level initiatives compare favourably with those that target a wide range of different companies. Put slightly differently, the generalist approach of the Global Compact may work for CSR challenges where a clear business case can easily be identified, such as addressing HIV/AIDS or tapping into opportunities at the base of the pyramid; corruption, by contrast, may be too complex an issue for such a generalist approach to be successful. In this context, it should also be born in mind that the UN Global Compact's 10 th Principle on anti-corruption was only added in 2004, more than four years after the initial launch of the initiative.
Conclusions
This paper started with the twin observations that corruption is both pervasive and rampant, and that the quality of corporate reporting has an important role to play in constraining corruption. Hence, the paper investigated whether there are any specific regions or sectors where firms are more active than in others in terms of addressing corruption. An examination of a sample of 933 sustainability reports, produced according to GRI G3 Reporting Guidelines, indeed showed strong regional-level differences. South and East Asian companies were found to have particularly high levels of coverage of the GRI indicators on corruption; whereas Eastern European countries showed especially low levels. Likewise, sector-level differences in reporting were identified, with banks showing significantly higher coverage and mining companies reporting less than their peers.
Having said this, no clear link seems to exist between the severity of the problem and the extent to which companies report on it. Our study thus stands in the vicinity of the emerging literature on silences in corporate reporting (Buhr, 1998 (Buhr, , 2001 Chwastiak and Young, 2003; Stittle, 2002) . We expected firms from countries with a low score (indicating a high level of corruption) on the TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to display a higher level of engagement; similarly one might expect firms operating in sectors with a low TI Bribe Payers Index Sector Score (BPI) to have a higher level of engagement. However, neither CPI nor BPI scores appear to explain the coverage of corruption-related indicators. While country and region of origin appear to determine a company's general approach to sustainability reporting, i.e. the breadth of information provided in these reports, the extent to which corruption is perceived to be a problem in a specific context does not appear to determine whether a company communicates its anti-corruption engagement or not. At the sectoral level, banking as the sector with the highest BPI score within the sample (indicating a low level of corruption) also shows the highest coverage levels of anti-corruption indicators.
Finally, participation in dedicated corruption-related initiatives, such as EITI, COST, PACI or the Wolfsberg Principles, appears to be positively related to corruption-related reporting, while UN Global Compact participation did not turn out to influence corruption-related reporting. Put differently, mono-thematic initiatives that are exclusively dedicated to the issue of anti-corruption clearly generate a higher impact than broader initiatives that address corruption as part of a wider CSR agenda.
A number of limitations of the paper need to be stated. As with previous studies into sustainability reporting, this study has a bias toward relatively large multinational enterprises as larger companies are more likely engage in non-financial reporting in the first place. The mean number of employees for companies included in this study is 30,856; the median value is 5,623. Secondly, there are complex dynamics with regard to the various host contexts in which these companies operate, which in turn are likely to influence their anti-corruption engagement (Spencer & Gomez, 2011; Spicer, Dunfee, & Bailey, 2004) . However, as sustainability reporting is typically driven by corporate headquarters, we would nevertheless expect a significant impact of a company's home country environment on its corruptionrelated reporting practices. Finally, while the framing of the analysis enabled us to investigate the extent to which companies communicate their anti-corruption engagement, it did not allow us to shed light on their actual engagement in anti-corruption measures. Irrespective of a company's anti-corruption efforts, corruption may not least exist as a deviant organizational practice. Whilst this is an important limitation, corruption-related reporting by itself should serve as an important tool for alleviating corruption as it helps to raise awareness of the issue and lends credibility to the reporting company's actual anti-corruption engagement.
These limitations open up a number of avenues for future research. To start with, future research could examine the link between the communication of anti-corruption initiatives and actual levels of corporate engagement in this area. Furthermore, the role of MNCs' host country operations could be investigated in more detail than was possible given the diverse sample employed in this study. Whilst a company's degree of internationalization did not significantly impact the results of this analysis and therefore host country operations can be expected to play a negligible role, previous studies have nonetheless found that a higher degree of internationalization or the presence in a particular host country has an impact on corporate social performance (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006) or charitable giving (Brammer, et al., 2009) . 
SO2 -Corruption Analysis
REN -Redes Energéticas
Nacionais (2008, p. 87) "The Group's accounts are subject to external audits and legal certification as required by law and therefore the company does not analyse the risk of corruption in its business units or areas. There have been no charges or investigations against Group companies for corruption in 2008 (0%)." Anglo Coal (2008, Appendix p. 8) "Anglo American does not tolerate any form of corruption (p. 18) . Corruption risk is considered within risk assessments conducted for all businesses along with many other forms of risk Anglo faces. Internal audit procedures also consider the risk of corruption within any process that is reviewed, along with the controls to mitigate the risk. If controls are not deemed sufficient from a design or operational effectiveness point of view then such matters will be reported along with management actions. Both the risk management and internal audit procedures are aimed at identifying broad risks facing the business relevant to the individual scope of the risk assessment and will consider corruption risk accordingly. Management remain responsible for the operation of controls to minimise the risk of corruption." Watercare Services (2009, p. 34) "Percentage and total number of business units analysed for risks related to corruption: Nil." Korea Gas Corporation (2008, p. 25) "In 2008 integrity evaluation results slightly dropped from 2007 due to one bribery case and 2.8 cases of entertaining in the gas supply and sales areas. To address these issues, we expanded the scope of our ethics camp to include sales and operational facility areas in addition to the previous contract & construction areas. We also plan to reinforce our employees' integrity pledge program." Centrica (2006, p. 204) "Centrica has a clear policy on bribery and corruption. All business units are required to operate in accordance with this policy. Our analysis highlighted no instances of corruption in ." Lonmin (2008 "The report includes data on the results of whistle-blowing procedures introduced by the company as well as the outcomes of corruption-related investigations, broken down into the categories 'No action taken', 'Disciplinary action taken', 'Criminal action taken', and 'Criminal and disciplinary action taken'." 
SO3 -Corruption Training
SO4 -Corruption Responses
